56. Id. to 159. Microsoft proposed a test used by a three-judge panel of the Court of Appeal to analyze software integration as part of an approval order Microsoft had entered into with the Department of Justice to settle an earlier case. This test stipulated that the technological link is considered legitimate where the defendant can justify a “plausible right” to the benefits of the tie. See id. The court, which meets in bane, also objected. But what has not emerged is a judicial consensus on the necessary extent of this anti-competitive effect. Should there be a risk of a monopolization of the product market as a result of a tie? If this sounds too extreme, how can we express and quantify the magnitude of the impact on the related product market? In any event, if an agreement of commitment can only be illegal where there is both demonstrable market power in the binding product and a visible anti-competitive effect on the related product market, the commitment agreements are no longer similar to what is considered questionable in itself. Determining whether these conditions apply is an empirically demanding task. To conclude, for example, that the commitment under the model developed by Carlton-Waldman produces anti-competitive effects, it is necessary to check whether the parameters of the model – for example. B The factors of business discounts and marginal costs of production, the lower costs of entering primary and complementary markets and consumer assessments for the various products offered by the monopoly and the potential operator of the market – are: that: In 1990, several authors developed models aimed at easing the conditions under which the link can prove anti-competitive.
Nalebuff, for example, has developed a model in which a company manufacturing goods A and B has a “credible” incentive to consolidate them to prevent entry.136 Unlike the Whinston model, the commitment complicates market entry, not because the monopoly is required to be the subject of a price war, but because it deprives the operator of an appropriate dimension. Credibility is not a problem here, because even if market entry is not compartmentalized, the price of the good B and the profits of the monopoly are higher than without. Intuition is as follows. As in Carbajo, De Meza and Seidman,137 in the Nalebuff model, are becoming a way for competing companies to differentiate their products and thus ease competition through prices. The monopolist sells both A and B related, while the trader only sells product B. Monopoly attracts customers with a high rating for A and B and charges them a high price, while the operator sells good B to consumers who have a low rating for good A and charge them a low price. The other robust assertion about the tether is that it generally includes both costs and benefits.